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[T]his Court can only look to the questions, whether the laws have been violated; and
if they were, justice demands, that the injured party should receive a suitable redress.1
The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the
creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal
executive action, tracing back to England.2
With the demise of federal general common law, a federal court’s authority to recognize
a damages remedy must rest at bottom on a statute enacted by Congress . . . .3
© 2021 Stephen I. Vladeck. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Charles Alan Wright Chair in Federal Courts, University of Texas School of Law.
My thanks to Molly Connor and the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for the invitation to
participate in the symposium for which this Essay was prepared (and their unfailing
patience thereafter); to Sam Bray for helpful early discussions that I still hope will turn into
their own coauthored paper one day; and to Anya Bidwell and the Institute for Justice for
the support that helped to make this Essay possible. By way of disclosure, I should note
that I was counsel of record for the petitioners in Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
Needless to say (although I’ll say it anyway), the views expressed herein are mine alone,
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the petitioners or their (other) counsel.
1 The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 367 (1824).
2 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015).
3 Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 286 (2001)).
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INTRODUCTION
No statute expressly authorizes civil suits against federal officials who violate the Constitution—for any form of relief.4 Although Congress certainly
has the power to enact such legislation (and has authorized such suits against
state officers),5 it has, for a number of reasons, never chosen to provide a
cause of action for constitutional violations by federal officers. Does Congress’s inaction leave courts powerless to enforce the Constitution through
civil litigation? Or are there circumstances in which it is not only appropriate, but necessary, for judges to fashion common-law civil remedies to vindicate constitutional rights?
As the second Justice Harlan put it in 1971, constitutional rights “are
aimed predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of the
popular will.”6 To that end, he wrote, it would be “anomalous” to conclude
that courts are powerless to provide remedies to enforce those rights simply
because the majority—the democratically elected political branches—has
refused to do so.7 To put it more bluntly, constitutional rights wouldn’t be
worth all that much if they provided nothing other than a defense to civil or
criminal enforcement proceedings. More than that, judicial enforcement of
the Constitution against the political branches is an essential aspect of meaningful government accountability.
And yet, in recent years, the Supreme Court has not only embraced different answers to these questions depending upon the type of relief that
plaintiffs have sought; it has embraced different methodological approaches
to how these questions should be answered in the first place. Indeed, even a
cursory perusal of the Court’s recent jurisprudence reveals profound inconsistencies as to whether (and to what extent) historical practice and Founding-era understandings of the federal judicial power can and should inform
the contemporary scope of judge-made remedies for federal constitutional
violations.
On one hand, the contemporary Court (unanimously) acknowledges
that, per one of the epigraphs, “[t]he ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional
actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and
reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing
back to England.”8 Thus, courts may fashion such relief in appropriate cases
even though Congress has not expressly authorized them to do so. And one
need not look far to see both high- and lower-profile Supreme Court deci4 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017).
5 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (authorizing damages for anyone acting under color of
state law who violates federal rights, including rights “secured by the Constitution”).
6 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
7 Id. at 403–04.
8 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015) (emphasis
added); see also id. at 336–37 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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sions in recent years turning on just such judge-made remedies, i.e., nonstatutory injunctions against unconstitutional conduct by federal officers.9
On the other hand, the same Court treats as virtually irrelevant the comparably “long history” of challenging completed unconstitutional conduct by
federal officers,10 including the robust regime of judge-made damages
actions that persisted well into the twentieth century in both state and federal
courts.11 Ditto the Justices’ more recent unwillingness to take seriously
Founding-era understandings of the scope of habeas corpus—also a legal, as
opposed to equitable, remedy—in interpreting the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.12 There, at least, the Court has claimed that it is attempting to
divine the scope of the writ at least “as it existed in 1789”;13 it’s only that its
historical work product has been unconvincing.14
The Supreme Court has never attempted to explain—or justify—the
methodological (and historiographical) dichotomy between the propriety vel
non of judge-made prospective and retrospective relief against federal
officers. Indeed, although the tension between these lines of cases is latent,
the Justices themselves have barely acknowledged that such an inconsistency
even exists. Only one opinion has even attempted to make the normative case
that judge-made injunctions against federal government action should generally be met with less skepticism than judge-made after-the-fact damages remedies.15 To say the least, it fails to persuade.16 Despite all of this, and despite
the venerable maxim that “equity follows the law,” rather than the other way
around,17 there seems to be widespread acceptance (or, at least, defeatism)
that this is just the way it is.
Professor Carlos Vázquez and I have explained in depth why the
Supreme Court’s evisceration of damages remedies for constitutional viola9 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891,
1916 (2020) (affirming an injunction against a federal policy).
10 See, e.g., Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020).
11 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Disingenuous Demise and Death of Bivens, 2019–2020 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 263, 267–70.
12 See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1975–76 (2020); see
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”).
13 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664
(1996)).
14 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 959–78
(2011) (book review) (noting the many historical shortcomings of contemporary judicial
analysis of the scope of habeas corpus at the time the Constitution was drafted).
15 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858, 1861–63 (2017).
16 Steve Vladeck, The Incoherence of the Normative Case Against Bivens, LAWFARE (June 21,
2017, 2:53 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/incoherence-normative-case-against-bivens.
17 The term is shorthand for the broader principle that equity is meant to provide a
backstop (and supplement) to legal remedies—to fill gaps in that regime, rather than to
take preeminence over it. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649–50 (2010) (discussing the relationship between law and equity).
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tions by federal officers is analytically and historically incoherent.18 And I
have written elsewhere about the extent to which modern constitutional remedies doctrine has turned a remarkably blind eye to foundational principles
of federalism—paying little more than lip service to the robust availability of
common-law damages (and habeas) remedies against federal officers in state
courts from the Founding through the Civil War—and, at least for damages,
well into the twentieth century.19 I don’t mean to rehash (or relitigate)
either argument here.
Rather, this Essay aims to build on that scholarship, asking a different
question: To Justices who insist on a methodological commitment to originalism (in whatever form),20 why has the uncontested understanding of the central role of judges in fashioning constitutional remedies against federal
officers at (and well after) the Founding played such an inconsistent role in
their contemporary analyses? That is to say, why is there an originalism-heavy
school of thought driving the Court’s modern jurisprudence of prospective
relief, but not retrospective relief?
The easy and obvious answer, of course, is that even the staunchest
originalists aren’t originalists about everything. But cynicism aside, the goal
of this Essay is to demonstrate that there is no good methodological or analytical justification for this dichotomy—for why the historical understanding
has mattered with respect to injunctive relief but has proven irrelevant with
respect to damages. Put another way, my thesis is that the Supreme Court’s
modern hostility to judge-made damages remedies against federal officers, in
contrast to its solicitude toward judge-made injunctive relief, is not just inconsistent with the original understanding; it is, because of that defect, affirmatively antithetical to originalism as a modality of constitutional interpretation.
Whatever the appropriate role of courts with regard to remedies for violations of statutory rights, this Essay argues that the same principles that drive
the ability of judges to fashion constitutional remedies for prospective relief
ought to drive their ability to fashion such remedies for retrospective relief.21
18 Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of
the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (2013).
19 Stephen I. Vladeck, Constitutional Remedies in Federalism’s Forgotten Shadow, 107 CALIF.
L. REV. 1043 (2019).
20 I do not mean to join the rich debate over the merits of “originalism” as a modality
of constitutional interpretation, or even the evolving debate over whether originalism is
properly understood to be focused on the original intent of the Founders or on the original
public meaning of the words they wrote—or whether those are even opposing constructions. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Unifying Original Intent and
Original Public Meaning, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1371 (2019). At least on the topic of this
Essay, there is no meaningful debate over what was understood at the time of the Founding
(or by whom); rather, the debate is only about the extent to which that understanding
does—and should—matter to contemporary courts.
21 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he presumed availability of federal equitable relief against threatened invasions of constitutional interests appears entirely
to negate the contention that the status of an interest as constitutionally protected divests
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Insofar as the Supreme Court has allowed the latter to diverge from the former, it has not only unmoored the doctrine from any satisfying analytical
tether; it has driven home that its aversion to some judge-made constitutional
remedies is not just ahistorical, but is methodologically incorrect even on (a
majority of) the Justices’ preferred terms.
I.

DAMAGES VERSUS INJUNCTIONS: THE PRESENT DICHOTOMY

It is familiar sledding that the Supreme Court over the past two decades has
become increasingly hostile to “implied” causes of action—to what Justice
Scalia derided as the “ancien regime,” during which federal courts often fashioned civil remedies in circumstances in which Congress had not expressly
authorized them.22 Initially, this hostility was pegged to the private judicial
enforcement of federal statutory rights. After all, the argument went, courts
would be arrogating legislative power were they to read statutes to provide
judicial relief that the drafters of the statute—the legislature—had not
expressly authorized.23
But to whatever extent that argument made sense in the context of
implied statutory causes of action,24 it was quickly expanded to encompass
other classes of claims—including suits to enforce federal statutes under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (which, to be clear, is an express statutory cause of action);25
suits to enforce (putatively) peremptory norms of international human rights
law under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350;26 and, as especially relevant here, suits seeking damages for constitutional violations by federal
officers under the Supreme Court’s 1971 Bivens decision.27 Indeed, by 2018,
this hostility to judge-made remedies had become so pervasive that Justice
Kennedy, writing for a majority in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, referred to it as
“this Court’s general reluctance to extend judicially created private rights of
action.”28
federal courts of the power to grant damages absent express congressional
authorization.”).
22 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001).
23 See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730–31 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
24 See Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 231–34 (2003) (criticizing this line of reasoning).
25 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002).
26 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
27 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1851–52 (2017); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Bivens is a relic of the heady days
in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing
them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition.”).
28 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402 (2018) (emphasis added); see also id. (“The Court’s recent
precedents cast doubt on the authority of courts to extend or create private causes of
action even in the realm of domestic law, where this Court has ‘recently and repeatedly
said that a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases.’” (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727)).
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In the specific context of “Bivens claims,” i.e., suits seeking judge-made
damages for constitutional violations by federal officers, there were at least
three reasons why this objection made (and continues to make) no sense.
First, unlike statutory (or common-law) rights, Bivens claims seek to enforce
constitutional protections against federal officers. It would hardly be “arrogating” legislative power to fashion relief for substantive rights the scope of
which was entirely beyond the legislature’s control. Again, this was perhaps
the central point of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Bivens itself.29
Second, although Justice Scalia’s Malesko concurrence attempted to
group Bivens in with the “ancien regime” of statutory interpretation decisions
that his majority opinion in Sandoval had repudiated seven months earlier,30
Bivens’s true lineage traced much further back in time. Indeed, as Part II
explains in more detail, judge-made remedies for damages arising out of constitutional violations by federal officers dated all the way back to the Founding—whether in state or federal court.31
Third, and in any event, the absence of any remedy for a constitutional
violation raises serious constitutional questions that generally do not arise
from the absence of a remedy for a statutory violation. In Hernández, for
instance, the petitioners would have been entitled to pursue a remedy under
state tort law before 1988—when Congress, in the Westfall Act, preempted
all state tort remedies against federal officers arising within the scope of their
federal employment.32 Although the petitioners therefore asked the
Supreme Court to also address whether, if they were not entitled to a Bivens
remedy, the Westfall Act was therefore unconstitutional insofar as it deprived
them of any other access to the courts,33 the Justices declined to take up that
question.34
Despite these material distinctions between implied constitutional damages remedies and implied statutory damages remedies, the Court eventually
collapsed the distinction—at least where claims against federal officers are
concerned. In Ziglar v. Abbasi, for instance, Justice Kennedy wrote for a 4–2
majority that, even though constitutional remedies raise materially different
considerations from statutory ones, “it is a significant step under separationof-powers principles for a court to determine that it has the authority, under
29 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
403–04 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
30 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 287 (2001).
31 See also Stephen I. Vladeck, Bivens Remedies and the Myth of the “Heady Days,” 8 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 513, 513–15 (2011) (explaining why the analogy between Bivens and implied
statutory remedies does not withstand scrutiny).
32 See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 § 5, 28
U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2018). On whether the Westfall Act meant to thereby preempt state tort
claims resting on constitutional violations, see Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 18, at 514–15.
33 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 23–27, Hernández v. Mesa, 139 S. Ct. 2636
(2019) (mem.) (No. 17-1678), 2018 WL 3155839, at *i, *23–27.
34 Hernández, 139 S. Ct. at 2636 (limiting the grant of certiorari to “Question 1
presented by the petition”).
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the judicial power, to create and enforce a cause of action for damages
against federal officials in order to remedy a constitutional violation.”35 In
particular,
[c]laims against federal officials often create substantial costs, in the form of
defense and indemnification. Congress, then, has a substantial responsibility to determine whether, and the extent to which, monetary and other liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers and employees of the
Federal Government. In addition, the time and administrative costs attendant upon intrusions resulting from the discovery and trial process are significant factors to be considered.36

Even though Abbasi thereby declined to recognize a series of Bivens
claims in circumstances in which the availability of an alternative remedy was
unclear, at best, it purported to leave open challenges to “individual
instances of discrimination or law enforcement overreach, which due to their
very nature are difficult to address except by way of damages actions after the
fact.”37 Indeed, Justice Kennedy went out of his way to stress that “this opinion is not intended to cast doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of Bivens in the search-and-seizure context in which it arose.”38 After all,
Bivens does vindicate the Constitution by allowing some redress for injuries,
and it provides instruction and guidance to federal law enforcement officers
going forward. The settled law of Bivens in this common and recurrent
sphere of law enforcement, and the undoubted reliance upon it as a fixed
principle in the law, are powerful reasons to retain it in that sphere.39

But after Justice Kavanaugh replaced Justice Kennedy, the Court backtracked from those commitments in Hernández v. Mesa,40 where it declined to
recognize a Bivens claim against a rogue federal law enforcement officer who
shot and killed an unarmed, fifteen-year-old Mexican teenager, allegedly
without provocation.41 Of the five Justices in the majority in Hernández, two
would have overruled Bivens altogether;42 the other three seemed content to
all but limit it to its facts.43
And although the Court in Hernández at least acknowledged the longer
historical tradition of judge-made damages claims, it dismissed the relevance
of that tradition in light of the Supreme Court’s 1938 rejection of federal
courts’ general common lawmaking powers in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.44
As Justice Alito wrote for the Court in Hernández, because of Erie:
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 1862.
Id. at 1856.
Id. at 1856–57 (emphasis added).
140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
Id. at 739–40.
Id. at 750–53 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 756–59 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 742 (majority opinion); see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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federal courts today cannot fashion new claims in the way that they could
before 1938. With the demise of federal general common law, a federal
court’s authority to recognize a damages remedy must rest at bottom on a
statute enacted by Congress, and no statute expressly creates a Bivens
remedy.45

For the proposition that, because of Erie, even constitutional damages remedies must be authorized by statute, Justice Alito offered only a single citation—to the Court’s rejection of implied statutory causes of action in
Alexander v. Sandoval.46 Thus, to whatever extent there might still be some
Bivens remedies going forward, Hernández certainly seems to bring the analogy to implied statutory causes of action (and the Court’s repudiation of
them) full circle.47
While all of this was happening, though, the Supreme Court has never
evinced similar skepticism to judge-made claims for prospective relief. To the
contrary, in a series of cases involving suits seeking relief for constitutional
violations by state officers, the Court repeatedly asserted not just the validity
of judge-made injunctive relief, but its necessity to “promote the vindication of
federal rights.”48 Thus, although the Eleventh Amendment,49 as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, foreclosed suits directly against nonconsenting states
even for constitutional violations,50 courts could enjoin state officers who
acted in violation of the Constitution without running afoul of sovereign
immunity (and, apparently, without arrogating Congress’s power to expressly
authorize such suits).51
The same logic applied a fortiori to federal officers.52 Although the
Supreme Court repeatedly struggled before 197653 with the question of when
45 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 742 (citations omitted) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)).
46 See id.
47 See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 276–79, 281–85 (criticizing Hernández and sketching
out its implications).
48 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
49 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”).
50 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9–15 (1890).
51 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149, 155–56 (1908). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 927–35 (7th ed. 2015) (fleshing out the
scope of Ex parte Young).
52 See, e.g., Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110 (1902) (“In
such a case, as the one before us, there is no adequate remedy at law, the injunction to
prohibit the further withholding of the mail from complainants being the only remedy at
all adequate to the full relief to which the complainants are entitled.”).
53 A 1976 amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act expressly waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity from any suit “seeking relief other than money
damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or
failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority.” Act of Oct. 21, 1976,

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL505.txt

unknown

Seq: 9

11-MAY-21

9:00

2021] t h e i n c o n s i s t e n t o r i g i n a l i s m o f j u d g e - m a d e r e m e d i e s 1877

the federal government’s sovereign immunity would bar suits for injunctive
relief against federal officers to enforce statutory rights,54 it never seriously
balked at the availability of such relief (or the central role of courts in providing it) in suits to enforce the Constitution.55 And even after the Court began
to express skepticism about judge-made remedies in other contexts, suits for
injunctive relief against federal officers proceeded without any meaningful
objection—sovereign immunity or otherwise.
That the historical acceptance of judge-made injunctions survived the
Court’s more recent repudiation of judge-made damages claims is best
encapsulated in a pair of cases from 2012 and 2015 raising the same issue—
whether Medicaid providers or beneficiaries could pursue injunctive relief
against state officers for enforcing state laws that set reimbursement rates so
low as to be inconsistent with the “equal access” requirement of the federal
Medicaid statute (and that thereby violated the Supremacy Clause).56
In the first case, Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California,
Inc., the majority ducked the question—on the ground that intervening
administrative action, which had (arguably) altered the posture of the dispute, should be considered in the first instance by the lower courts.57 But
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, dissented—arguing that, regardless of the intervening administrative action, the
answer should be no.58 As the Chief Justice wrote, no judge-made injunction
should be available to private parties to enforce a federal statute that they
could not otherwise enforce directly:
[T]o say that there is a federal statutory right enforceable under the
Supremacy Clause, when there is no such right under the pertinent statute
itself, would effect a complete end run around this Court’s implied right of
action and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 jurisprudence. . . . This body of law would serve
Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702). Thus, today,
sovereign immunity provides no obstacle to any suit seeking injunctive relief against a federal officer for violating the Constitution.
54 See, e.g., Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). As Professor Sisk has explained,
under the Larson-Malone sovereign immunity doctrine, a suit may be maintained
directly against a governmental officer under two circumstances. First, if the
officer allegedly acted outside of the authority conferred upon his or her office by
Congress, that is, beyond delegated statutory power, then his or her conduct will
be treated as individual in nature and will be neither attributed to the sovereign
nor barred by sovereign immunity. Second, if the officer acted within the conferred statutory limits of the office, but his or her conduct allegedly offended a
provision of the Constitution, then sovereign immunity again is lifted. In sum,
when a government officer acts . . . .
Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 439,
457 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
55 See, e.g., Larson, 337 U.S. at 689–92.
56 For background, see Bruce C. Vladeck & Stephen I. Vladeck, Killing Medicaid the
California Way, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, at A31.
57 See 565 U.S. 606, 613–16 (2012).
58 See id. at 620–21 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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no purpose if a plaintiff could overcome the absence of a statutory right of
action simply by invoking a right of action under the Supremacy Clause to
the exact same effect.59

The Chief Justice’s dissent would therefore have limited the availability of
judge-made injunctions based upon the same concerns animating the
Court’s rejection of judge-made damages. Indeed, the quoted passage
expressly cited one of those cases—Gonzaga University v. Doe, which the Chief
Justice had (successfully) argued while in private practice.60
But even Chief Justice Roberts agreed that judge-made injunctions
would still be appropriate in some circumstances—“to enforce the supremacy
of federal law when such action gives effect to the federal rule, rather than
contravening it.”61 In other words, the Chief Justice’s Douglas dissent did not
disclaim the power of federal courts to fashion judge-made injunctive relief
in appropriate cases; it merely would have narrowed the class of cases in
which such relief was “appropriate.”62
Thus, when the same issue returned to the Court three years later in
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., the Chief Justice joined Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion, which reasserted that “[t]he ability to sue to enjoin
unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts
of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive
action, tracing back to England.”63 Although this discussion came as part of
a broader holding that such a cause of action did not derive from the Constitution itself, it necessarily endorsed the idea that such judge-made remedies
are not inappropriate solely because they are judge-made.
The Armstrong majority went on to hold that the federal government’s
administrative enforcement role, as contemplated by the Medicaid statute,
necessarily displaced any remedies that would traditionally have been available in equity.64 And yet, although there is much to criticize in that holding,65 the critical point for present purposes is that the Court viewed such
statutory displacement as necessary—that, but for the Medicaid statute’s remedial provisions, a nonstatutory claim for an injunction would have remained
available. At the same time as the Court was closing the federal courthouse
door to judge-made damages remedies (even for constitutional violations),
59 Id. at 619 (citations omitted).
60 See id. (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286 (2002)).
61 Id. at 620.
62 For a critique of the Chief Justice’s analysis on this point, see Stephen I. Vladeck,
Douglas and the Fate of Ex parte Young, 122 YALE L.J ONLINE 13 (2012).
63 See 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015).
64 See id. at 328–31; see also id. at 333–36 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (arguing that Congress intended to foreclose injunctive relief in these
specific factual circumstances).
65 See id. at 341–47 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Steve Vladeck, Armstrong: Is
Utterly Disingenuous Statutory Interpretation Ever Worth It?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 31, 2015, 8:27
PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/03/armstrong-is-utterly-disingenuous-statutory-interpretation-ever-worth-it.html.
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then, it was also reaffirming the availability—and, in some cases, the propriety—of judge-made prospective relief.
To underscore the point, consider footnote 2 of Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, a suit for injunctive relief against federal officers (and a federal
agency) in which the Court invalidated part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the
ground that it violated the separation of powers:
The Government asserts that “petitioners have not pointed to any case in
which this Court has recognized an implied private right of action directly
under the Constitution to challenge governmental action under the
Appointments Clause or separation-of-powers principles.” The Government
does not appear to dispute such a right to relief as a general matter, without
regard to the particular constitutional provisions at issue here. If the Government’s point is that an Appointments Clause or separation-of-powers
claim should be treated differently than every other constitutional claim, it
offers no reason and cites no authority why that might be so.66

Faced with an argument from the Solicitor General that the Court should not
expand an implied cause of action to encompass a new context, the exact
kind of argument that had featured so prominently in the Court’s restriction
of implied damages remedies, the Justices’ “general reluctance to extend
judicially created private rights of action”67 was nowhere to be found.
II.

DAMAGES

AND

INJUNCTIONS

FROM THE

FOUNDING ONWARD

Part I established that the contemporary Supreme Court is simultaneously hostile to judge-made damages remedies for constitutional violations by
federal officers, but quite solicitous of judge-made equitable remedies for the
same. This Part demonstrates that this divergence is a modern phenomenon. Both before and after the merger of law and equity, the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence reflected no such distinction well into the twentieth
century. If anything, in line with traditional principles concerning the relationship between the two, the Court’s expressed preference was for damages
in cases in which they were adequate. In all cases, though, the propriety of
judge-made remedies in the absence of express statutory authorization was
never disputed; the assumption was that, so long as Congress had conferred
subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute, “federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”68 As Justice Black wrote for the
Court in 1946, “where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.”69
66 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 (2010) (citations omitted).
67 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402 (2018).
68 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
69 Id. (first citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162–63 (1803); and then
citing Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,
569–70 (1930)).
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This was so because, in drafting the Constitution, the Founders
intended, in the respects relevant here, to replicate many of the features of
the English legal system of the time—including the by-then well-settled ability of courts to use nonstatutory remedies as a mechanism for holding government officers (and, through them, the government) to account.70
Federal courts may not always have had subject-matter jurisdiction (Congress
would not bestow general federal question jurisdiction upon the lower federal courts until 1875),71 but in cases in which federal courts had jurisdiction,
it was understood that they could fashion nonstatutory remedies for official
misconduct.
I’ve described the nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions repeatedly sustaining (and, in some cases, themselves fashioning) judge-made damages remedies in detail elsewhere.72 Suffice it to say, “[a]t the Founding, and
for much of American history, there was no question as to whether federal
courts had the power to provide judge-made damages remedies against individual federal officers. Not only did federal courts routinely provide such
relief, but the Supreme Court repeatedly blessed the practice,”73 as far back
as one of the first appeals argued to Chief Justice Marshall.74 At least initially, many of these rulings came in admiralty cases,75 but that was largely a
function of the limited scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction at the
time. As early as 1817, the Supreme Court expressly affirmed the power of
state courts to award damages against federal officers who had acted
unlawfully.76
At the same time as the Court showed no hesitation to award judgemade damages against federal officers, it also showed no reluctance to sustain injunctive relief in cases in which it was appropriate. Most famously, in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States in 1824, Chief Justice Marshall sustained an
injunction against an Ohio state official who unlawfully withdrew money
from a branch of the Second Bank of the United States even though (1) no
statute expressly provided a right to seek it; and (2) the Eleventh Amendment would have barred the same suit had it been brought directly against
70 See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 197–213 (abr. student ed. 1965).
71 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
72 See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 267–70.
73 Id. at 267.
74 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), was argued December 16 and 19,
1801—during the Court’s first regular sitting after Chief Justice Marshall’s swearing-in in
February of that year. See ANNE ASHMORE, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., DATES OF SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS AND ARGUMENTS 4 (2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/
datesofdecisions.pdf; Supreme Court Nominations (1789–Present), U.S. SENATE, https://
www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm#19
(last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
75 See., e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 373–74 (1824); Little, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) at 178.
76 See Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1817).
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Ohio.77 After explaining that the Bank’s “sue and be sued clause” gave it the
authority to invoke federal jurisdiction (and was constitutional in so providing),78 Marshall devoted eight pages of his analysis to why an injunction was
appropriate under traditional principles of equity—without so much as a
word about whether the fact that the remedy was judge-made called its propriety into question.79
Just three days after Osborn, the Court handed down its opinion in The
Apollon—a tort action brought by the master of a French ship that had been
seized by a U.S. official while in Spanish waters.80 Although the case
presented significant foreign policy and diplomatic implications,81 Justice
Story’s opinion for the Court dismissed them, explaining that “this Court can
only look to the questions, whether the laws have been violated; and if they
were, justice demands, that the injured party should receive a suitable
redress.”82 Because the seizure in question was “wholly without justification
under our laws,” the U.S. official could not avoid plaintiff’s common-law
damages claim—even though the seizure took place outside the territorial
United States.83
To be sure, damages remedies were more commonplace than injunctions during the first century under the Constitution—but that was at least in
part a reflection of their robustness, and the long-settled view that no equitable remedy could be provided where an adequate remedy existed at law.84
The more that the Supreme Court endorsed judge-made damages remedies
against federal officers—as it did time and again from 1804 onward—the less
that it was asked to resort to equity. The only regular question in these cases
was whether they were properly brought in state or federal court—which necessarily evolved alongside the initial adoption and subsequent expansion of
the federal officer removal statute.85
That did not mean, of course, that the Supreme Court never issued nonstatutory injunctions; again, Osborn was an important precedent to the contrary. But the primary mechanism for holding federal officers (and, through
them, the federal government) accountable throughout the nineteenth century was suits for damages arising under either state law or, especially after
Swift v. Tyson,86 the “general” common law. Moreover, as Professor Jim
Pfander and Jonathan Hunt recently demonstrated, the liability regime nec77 See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 849–50, 870–71 (1824).
78 See id. at 817–28.
79 See id. at 838–46.
80 The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 363.
81 See id. at 366.
82 Id. at 367.
83 Id. at 365–66, 372, 379.
84 See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871).
85 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2018). The evolution of the statute, the first iteration of
which was enacted in 1815, is described in Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405–06
(1969).
86 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
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essarily assumed the propriety of judge-made damages remedies, leaving the
question of whether the officers should be indemnified to Congress—which
provided such relief in approximately sixty percent of the cases Pfander and
Hunt surveyed.87
Critically, no one ever suggested that federal courts were powerless to
act—whether to award damages or injunctive relief—against federal officers
until and unless Congress expressly authorized them to do so. Whether
because Founding-era and nineteenth-century jurists assumed that Congress
had provided such authorization simply by conferring subject-matter jurisdiction, or they believed that no specific congressional endorsement was necessary, the result was the same: the power of federal courts to issue judge-made
remedies in cases in which they had jurisdiction was simply never in dispute.
Nor were these cases limited to claims arising under statutes, contracts,
or other subconstitutional bodies of law. Instead, constitutional rights were
increasingly litigated through tort suits—where state (or general) common
law provided the cause of action and the federal officer asserted a public
authority defense, one that inevitably turned on whether he was acting within
or without the Constitution.88 Thus, perhaps the canonical statement came
from the Supreme Court in 1902—directing the lower court to impose a preliminary injunction against the Postmaster General for ordering a
subordinate to refuse delivery of certain items of mail.89 As Justice Peckham
wrote for the Court:
The Postmaster General’s order being the result of a mistaken view of the
law could not operate as a defense to this action on the part of the defendant, though it might justify his obedience thereto until some action of the
court. In such a case, as the one before us, there is no adequate remedy at
law, the injunction to prohibit the further withholding of the mail from
complainants being the only remedy at all adequate to the full relief to
which the complainants are entitled.90

As was true in pre-revolutionary England, “equity followed the law,” and federal courts fashioned remedies against federal officers from both.
III.

THE WEAK CASE(S)

FOR

INJUNCTIONS

OVER

DAMAGES

As Part II shows, the dichotomy between how the contemporary Court views
judge-made prospective relief for constitutional violations by federal officers
and judge-made retrospective relief finds no support in Founding-era understandings or historical practice. If anything, those materials and that practice
reflected traditional understandings about the relationship between legal
87 See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1867–68
(2010).
88 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 18, at 531–42.
89 See Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 98, 111 (1902).
90 Id. at 110. McAnnulty was not just a canonical statement of the law as of the turn of
the twentieth century; it was also the fountainhead of what Professor Jaffe has described as
the “presumption of judicial review” that followed. See JAFFE, supra note 70, at 339–53.
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and equitable relief—and the canonical view that “equity follows the law,”
rather than the reverse.
For Justices committed to interpreting the Constitution by reference to
such Founding-era understandings and historical practice, that analysis
ought to lend itself to two related conclusions: First, there is no justification
for viewing judge-made damages remedies against federal officers with any
greater skepticism than judge-made injunctions. Both are exercises of judicial power that were both commonplace and significant to patterns of official
accountability at (and after) the Founding. Second, there is no justification
for being particularly skeptical about either mode of relief as an appropriate
exercise of federal judicial power in the abstract—again, at least by reference
to prevailing understandings when the Constitution was written and first
entered into effect. That’s not to say that plaintiffs will always be entitled to
relief, but rather that the existence vel non of a cause of action was never
central to judicial analysis in such cases—and certainly did not differ depending upon whether the action was one at law or in equity.
Notwithstanding those conclusions, the Supreme Court in recent years
has not only continued to expand the distinctions between these two modes
of relief; it has, for the first time, attempted to defend such reasoning. In
Abbasi, for instance, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion endeavored to
explain why injunctions were preferable to damages in at least some suits challenging unconstitutional federal conduct.91 And in Hernández, Justice Alito’s
majority opinion dismissed the Founding-era and historical understandings
described in Part II on the putative ground that they were implicitly but necessarily repudiated by Erie.92
This Part turns to those two defenses (and one other possible distinction
that the Justices have offered with regard to suits against state officers) and
explains why they are each unavailing in their own right. No less important,
though, is that none of these arguments are predicated on any claim about
what was understood to be true at the Founding—or in widespread judicial
practice for at least the first two centuries thereafter. Thus, even if one is
persuaded by the merits of these justifications (and I am not), what cannot
be gainsaid about them is how little they have to do with any species of
originalism.
A.

Abbasi and the Normative Case Against Damages

Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Abbasi included perhaps the most
sustained effort to articulate prudential and/or normative reasons why federal courts should be more skeptical of judge-made damages remedies for
constitutional violations by federal officers than of judge-made injunctions.
Among other things, as Justice Kennedy wrote:
[T]he decision to recognize a damages remedy requires an assessment of its
impact on governmental operations systemwide. Those matters include the
91
92

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
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burdens on Government employees who are sued personally, as well as the
projected costs and consequences to the Government itself when the tort
and monetary liability mechanisms of the legal system are used to bring
about the proper formulation and implementation of public policies.93

And although those concerns would apply to all damages suits arising
out of constitutional violations by federal officers, Justice Kennedy suggested
that they were especially pronounced in cases implicating national security:
National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President. Judicial inquiry into the national-security realm raises “concerns for
the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to the other
branches.” These concerns are even more pronounced when the judicial
inquiry comes in the context of a claim seeking money damages rather than
a claim seeking injunctive or other equitable relief. The risk of personal
damages liability is more likely to cause an official to second-guess difficult
but necessary decisions concerning national-security policy.94

As I’ve previously argued, Abbasi’s reasoning on these points suffered
from at least three distinct analytical shortcomings: First, Justice Kennedy
provided no support for his claim about the economic and noneconomic
costs that recognition of damages remedies would impose—besides a handful of references to previous Supreme Court decisions which themselves cited
no more compelling sources.95 And there is significant (and compelling)
empirical academic research to the contrary.96
Among other things, the federal government generally indemnifies its
officers from damages liability for any and all conduct that falls within the
scope of their employment.97 To that end, any costs created by such suits are
inevitably borne by the federal government—not the individual officers.
That doesn’t mean these costs don’t exist, but it does call into at least some
question Justice Kennedy’s breezy assertion that individual officers will be
ever-mindful of the potential impact on their own bottom lines. More than
that, as one recent study unearthed, even the relevant agency is seldom forced
to pay a successful damages judgment out of its budget; rather, such judgments are paid out of the general Judgment Fund of the U.S. Department of
93 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017).
94 Id. at 1861 (citations omitted) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417
(2002)); see also id. at 1860–61 (“[T]he discovery and litigation process would either border upon or directly implicate the discussion and deliberations that led to the formation of
the policy in question. Allowing a damages suit in this context, or in a like context in other
circumstances, would require courts to interfere in an intrusive way with sensitive functions
of the Executive Branch.” (citation omitted)).
95 Id. at 1855–58; see Vladeck, supra note 16.
96 See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of
Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 566 (2020)
(“[T]he federal government effectively held its officers harmless in over 95% of the successful cases brought against them, and paid well over 99% of the compensation received
by plaintiffs in these cases.”).
97 See id. at 613.
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Treasury98—negating any argument that such liability has budgetary consequences even for the offending officer’s immediate employer.
Second, and as importantly, the concern about noneconomic costs is
already accounted for by a number of other doctrines—qualified immunity
foremost among them. Indeed, the principal justification for qualified immunity is the need to forestall discovery, let alone a trial, in any case in which the
plaintiff cannot plausibly allege facts that, if true, would establish a violation
of clearly established constitutional rights.99 Among other things, that’s why
a trial court’s interlocutory denial of a motion to dismiss based upon qualified immunity is, in most cases, an immediately appealable “collateral
order.”100
Insofar as Justice Kennedy worried that “[t]he risk of personal damages
liability is more likely to cause an official to second-guess difficult but necessary decisions concerning national-security policy,”101 that’s the precise justification typically invoked (including by Justice Kennedy himself) to defend
the qualified immunity doctrine.102 Using those concerns to justify not even
recognizing a cause of action (including in cases in which the defendant
would not be entitled to qualified immunity) not only has the effect of
“double counting” them,103 but it also converts qualified immunity into a
functional form of absolute immunity—because damages will be unavailable
no matter how egregious the officer defendant’s conduct may have been.104
Third, the most significant concern that seemed to be animating Justice
Kennedy—that courts might “interfere in an intrusive way with sensitive functions of the Executive Branch”105—is, without question, a far greater issue in
suits for prospective relief (where plaintiffs seek to halt ongoing government
action) than in suits for damages long after the government action at issue
has ceased. A court order directing the government, under pain of contempt, to halt an ongoing military operation,106 or to pause a new immigra98 See id. at 566–67.
99 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807–08, 815–18 (1982); Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
100 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985).
101 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017).
102 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 746–47 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“If national officeholders were subject to personal liability whenever they confronted disagreement among appellate courts, those officers would be deterred from full use of their
legal authority. The consequences of that deterrence must counsel caution by the Judicial
Branch, particularly in the area of national security.” (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
685 (2009)).
103 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 601–03 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 635 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
104 See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 283 (“[T]he absence of a cause of action, although it
sounds technical, is tantamount to a form of functional absolute immunity where no
recourse is available no matter how far over the line federal officers tread.”).
105 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861.
106 See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 484 F.2d 1307
(2d Cir. 1973).
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tion policy,107 necessarily reflects a far more significant intrusion into the
“sensitive functions of the Executive Branch” than an after-the-fact damages
action. Separate from the optics of such a remedy, there are factual and legal
reasons why courts may not be in the best position to resolve the dispute,
including the possibility that critical facts will only become clear in
retrospect.108
A judge-made damages remedy, in contrast, raises none of those concerns—especially when accompanied by both indemnification and qualified
immunity. That’s not to say that there are no costs; clearly, there are. But
“those costs seem . . . to pale in comparison to the very real (and real-time)
costs that prospective relief imposes (and can impose) on national security
policies and policymakers.”109 And whereas that might be a reason to
oppose all judicial review in cases implicating national security, that wasn’t
Justice Kennedy’s argument in Abbasi. Instead, he insisted that “[t]hese concerns are even more pronounced when the judicial inquiry comes in the context of a claim seeking money damages rather than a claim seeking injunctive
or other equitable relief.”110
Simply put, Justice Kennedy’s attempt to offer a normative case for preferring injunctions to damages, whether in national security cases specifically
or in all challenges to unconstitutional conduct by federal officers, does not
withstand meaningful scrutiny—even on its own terms. Worse still, even on
its merits, it relied upon a host of policy-oriented concerns that, in other
contexts, the Justices have insisted are better left for Congress. As Justice
Thomas wrote for the Court last December, in explaining why an express
statutory provision for damages against a “government” should be understood to allow damages suits against government officers in their individual
capacity,
The [federal] Government also posits that we should be wary of damages against government officials because these awards could raise separation-of-powers concerns. But this exact remedy has coexisted with our
constitutional system since the dawn of the Republic. To be sure, there may
be policy reasons why Congress may wish to shield Government employees

107 See, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal.
2018), aff’d, 950 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2020).
108 A common example is whether the use of lethal force by a law enforcement officer
was justified. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). For more on the affirmative case
to prefer damages in national security litigation, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Targeted Killing
and Judicial Review, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 11, 24 (2014).
109 Vladeck, supra note 16.
110 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861 (emphasis added). In the process, Justice Kennedy
appeared to be suggesting that it was more important for courts to stay their hand when
individual officers might be liable than when the entire federal government would be
affected. See Vladeck, supra note 16. Even if that is a satisfying reason to privilege injunctions over damages, it is based upon the fallacy that the individual officer faces any meaningful specter of bearing the burden alone.
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from personal liability, and Congress is free to do so. But there are no constitutional reasons why we must do so in its stead.111

So too, here.
B.

Hernández and Erie

Separate from its intrinsic shortcomings, Justice Kennedy’s analysis in
Abbasi also did nothing to explain why the Founding-era and historical practice was wrong—or, if it wasn’t, what had happened since to disrupt it. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Sosa in 2004 had provided the first seeds
of an argument to that end—that it was all about Erie.112 As he wrote with
respect to whether a federal common-law rule of decision grounded in
norms of international human rights law could be inferred from the Alien
Tort Statute, “Because today’s federal common law is not our Framers’ general common law, the question presented by the suggestion of discretionary
authority to enforce the law of nations is not whether to extend old-school
general-common-law adjudication. Rather, it is whether to create new federal common law.”113 Of course, the Court had already agreed to create new
federal common law in federal officer suits; as Justice Scalia himself had
explained for the Court sixteen years earlier, “Another area that we have
found to be of peculiarly federal concern, warranting the [judicial] displacement of state law, is the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in
the course of their duty.”114 It’s just that the federal common law the Court
had created there was a defense—to wit, qualified immunity.
But whereas Justice Scalia framed the Erie question as whether federal
common-law remedies should be recognized in lieu of state ones (and his
opinion in Boyle offered one argument in favor of doing so), the Hernández
majority read Erie as altogether foreclosing the possibility. In particular, the
petitioners in Hernández had argued that Bivens had to be understood in context—as part of a longstanding historical practice, dating to the Founding, in
which state and federal courts routinely fashioned judge-made damages remedies against federal officers who had acted ultra vires.115 The federal government (as an amicus curiae in support of the respondent) dismissed that
historical practice as “beside the point,”116 and Justice Alito’s majority opinion agreed:
111 Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 493 (2020).
112 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 744–46 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
113 Id. at 746; see also Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1413 n.1 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[F]ollowing our decision in
Erie . . . , federal courts are generally no longer permitted to promulgate new federal
common law causes of action in [tort or contract cases].” (citation omitted)).
114 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 505 (1988).
115 Brief for Petitioners at 10–19, Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 171678), 2019 WL 3714475, at *10–19.
116 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 13, Hernández, 140 S. Ct. 735 (No. 17-1678), 2019 WL 4858283, at *13.
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[F]inding that a damages remedy is implied by a provision that makes no
reference to that remedy may upset the careful balance of interests struck by
the lawmakers.
This problem does not exist when a common-law court, which exercises
a degree of lawmaking authority, fleshes out the remedies available for a
common-law tort. Analogizing Bivens to the work of a common-law court,
petitioners and some of their amici make much of the fact that common-law
claims against federal officers for intentional torts were once available. But
Erie held that “[t]here is no federal general common law,” and therefore
federal courts today cannot fashion new claims in the way that they could
before 1938.
With the demise of federal general common law, a federal court’s
authority to recognize a damages remedy must rest at bottom on a statute
enacted by Congress, and no statute expressly creates a Bivens remedy.117

There are at least three problems with this reading of Erie. First, it misreads Erie itself—as limiting “a federal court’s authority to recognize a damages remedy” to cases in which a “statute expressly creates a Bivens
remedy.”118 But “Erie did not generally repudiate the federal courts’ power
to fashion common law; it merely repudiated the power to do so generally.”119 After all, on the same day that the Supreme Court rejected the existence of “general” federal common law in Erie, it reiterated the propriety of
federal judicial lawmaking in narrower—and more substantively appropriate—circumstances, which the Court has continued to flesh out in the eight
decades since.120 And the Supreme Court also continued, after Erie, to stress
the central role state tort law played in holding federal officers
accountable.121
Thus, Erie called into question neither the general understanding that
judge-made remedies are central to holding individual federal officers
accountable, nor the specific possibility that judge-made federal remedies
would be appropriate in some cases. The only difference was that, unlike
before Erie, federal courts needed specific justifications for applying federal,
as opposed to state, common law. But that distinction only raises the question of whether federal judge-made remedies are appropriate; it doesn’t
answer it.
Second, neither Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hernández nor any
other analysis has explained why it took the Court the better part of seventy
years to appreciate this apparently seismic impact of Erie. Indeed, by that
logic, the rise of implied statutory causes of action in the 1960s would have
117 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 742 (citations omitted).
118 See id.
119 Vladeck, supra note 11, at 278.
120 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); see
also Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1679 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the
contexts in which the Court has continued to fashion federal common law after Erie). See
generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 383, 405, 421–22 (1964).
121 E.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963).
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itself been flatly inconsistent with Erie. And yet, no one at the time seems to
have noticed. Even the Nixon administration, in arguing against recognition
of a judge-made federal damages remedy on behalf of the defendants in Bivens, did not read Erie so aggressively.122
Third, and most importantly for present purposes, even if Erie had the
impact that Justice Alito claims, there is nothing in Hernández (or Erie, for
that matter) that explains why Erie’s fundamental reconfiguration of federal
judicial power in this respect would be limited to cases seeking retrospective
relief. If Erie did, indeed, foreclose the power of federal courts to fashion
judge-made remedies without authorization from Congress (as opposed to
requiring class-specific justifications for fashioning federal—versus state—
rules), how could it have simultaneously preserved the federal courts’ power to
do so when plaintiffs sought only prospective relief?
After all, although the formal merger of law and equity would postdate
Erie by five months, Erie’s repudiation of general federal common law is
hardly remedy-specific. As the Supreme Court explained seven years after
Erie, even before the merger of law and equity, federal courts applied the
Rules of Decision Act123 without distinguishing between the two systems.124
If, as Hernández concludes, Erie categorically forecloses the fashioning of federal judge-made remedies for damages, what possible argument would distinguish federal judge-made remedies for injunctions? Needless to say, neither
Justice Alito’s majority opinion nor Justice Thomas’s concurrence endeavors
to answer that question.
C.

Edelman and Sovereign Immunity

At least where state officers are concerned, there is a richer body of
Supreme Court opinions articulating distinctions between judge-made remedies for prospective and retrospective relief. Indeed, in a line of cases from
Edelman v. Jordan125 onward, the Supreme Court has, rightly or wrongly, read
the availability of relief under Ex parte Young to turn quite sharply on whether
a plaintiff seeks relief properly characterized as “prospective.”126 If the relief
is not properly so characterized, then a claim against a nonconsenting state,
122 See Brief for Respondents at 19–20, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (No. 301), 1970 WL 116900, at *19–20
(citing Erie for the proposition that post-Erie federal common law requires particular
justifications).
123 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.”).
124 Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103–04 (1945), overruled on other grounds by
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
125 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
126 See id. at 663–71; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
104–06 (1984) (explaining the importance of the distinction to Edelman and related
cases).
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or against an officer of a nonconsenting state in her official capacity, is foreclosed by the sovereign immunity that the Supreme Court has pegged to the
Eleventh Amendment.127 At least superficially, this seems to be the closest
thing yet to a body of law expressing a sharp preference for injunctions over
damages. But the notion that sovereign immunity (or, at the very least, the
Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence) generally effects a preference for injunctive relief over damages is belied by two considerations—
one applicable to suits challenging state official misconduct, and one applicable to suits challenging federal official misconduct.
To the former, these cases were all decided against the backdrop of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which, at least by 1961,128 was clearly understood to authorize
damages claims against state officers who violated federal rights. Edelman
and its progeny controversially limited the circumstances in which federal
courts could award injunctive relief directly against states (or arms thereof),
but the “officer fiction” still provided a way through the federal (and state)
courthouse doors for plaintiffs challenging unconstitutional state action.
To the latter, although Congress waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity in suits for injunctive relief in 1976, there was no suggestion
that, prior to 1976, sovereign immunity generally barred such suits. Rather, as
noted above,129 the Supreme Court articulated a complex framework for
ascertaining when claims for prospective relief truly were or were not properly
understood as being brought against the United States—rather than individual officers thereof. Sovereign immunity loomed in the background, but not
as an on/off switch depending upon the nature of the relief being sought.
*

*

*

There may be other arguments for why there is no tension in the
Supreme Court’s contrasting contemporary view of judicial power vis-à-vis
nonstatutory constitutional remedies against federal officers. But such an
argument would not, at first blush, find any support in Founding-era materials or historical practice. And it has not even been alluded to by the
Supreme Court. If nothing else, this lacuna suggests not only that the
Court’s contemporary approach to judge-made remedies against federal
officers is inconsistent, but also that, at least with respect to damages for constitutional violations, it is based upon some as-yet-unidentified theory of government accountability—one that has no apparent connection to any
previously articulated conception of originalism.

127 See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
128 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172–87 (1961) (interpreting “under color of law”
in § 1983 to encompass both authorized and unauthorized conduct by state officers within
the scope of their employment).
129 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL505.txt

unknown

Seq: 23

11-MAY-21

9:00

2021] t h e i n c o n s i s t e n t o r i g i n a l i s m o f j u d g e - m a d e r e m e d i e s 1891

CONCLUSION
My goal in this Essay has been to demonstrate that (1) the modern
Supreme Court takes an inconsistent approach to the propriety of judgemade remedies for constitutional violations by federal officers; (2) no such
inconsistency existed at the Founding or for quite some time thereafter; and
(3) no good explanation exists for why, at some point along the way, the
federal judicial role with respect to fashioning injunctions and fashioning
damages began to diverge so radically. The hardest question, of course, is
why, if all of this is true, the Supreme Court’s current doctrine not only says
what it says, but is outwardly oblivious to these shortcomings.
One possibility may be a widespread misunderstanding by contemporary
courts and commentators of the role that nonstatutory remedies played at
the Founding—a misunderstanding exacerbated by a related misunderstanding about the vitality of such relief in state courts at least up to the Civil War.
Consider in this regard a recent concurring opinion by Judge Oldham—who
argued, repeatedly, that the scope of habeas corpus in pre-revolutionary
England and in post-revolutionary America was defined entirely by statute, so
that the scope of those statutes should govern the scope of any constitutional
challenges to contemporary limits on post-conviction review.130
It is by now clear beyond peradventure that Judge Oldham is wrong
about the preeminence and predominance of statutory habeas remedies both
before and after the Founding. Archival research in England and in U.S.
state courts has unearthed concrete evidence that common-law writs of habeas
corpus played a central role both in preserving individual liberty and promoting governmental accountability.131 To focus only on what was true in the
lower federal courts during a period in which their jurisdiction was remarkably constrained by both statute and practice is thus to miss most of the forest
by focusing on the closest tree.
But at least Judge Oldham viewed what (he believed) was true at the
Founding as the relevant baseline, rather than dismissing such Founding-era
materials as “beside the point.” The Supreme Court’s recent evisceration of
judge-made damages remedies against federal officers for constitutional violations doesn’t even have that to commend it. Instead, a majority of the Justices have hung their hats on a series of modern doctrinal and normative
arguments that are not only unconvincing in their own right, but that are
necessarily indifferent to the historical legacy of government accountability.
Perhaps one day, the Court will explain (convincingly or otherwise) why
Founding-era understandings and historical practice simultaneously justify
both a general solicitude for judge-made injunctive relief against federal
130 See Beras v. Johnson, 978 F.3d 246, 253–56 (5th Cir. 2020) (Oldham, J.,
concurring).
131 See generally PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010)
(publishing the results of archival research into habeas practice in England before and
after the revolution); Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for Federal Extrajudicial Detainees, 92
MINN. L. REV. 265 (2007) (carefully studying pre–Civil War state habeas practice for federal
prisoners, most of which was through common law writs).
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officers and a categorical aversion to judge-made damages against the same
defendants. But it hasn’t yet.

